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Abstract
Background: Disembodiment is a core feature of depersonalization disorder (DPD). Given the narratives of DPD patients
about their disembodiment and emotional numbing and neurobiological findings of an inhibition of insular activity, DPD
may be considered as a mental disorder with specific impairments of interoceptive awareness and body perception.
Methods: We investigated cardioceptive accuracy (CA) of DPD patients (n = 24) as compared to healthy controls (n = 26)
with two different heartbeat detection tasks (‘‘Schandry heartbeat counting task’’ and ‘‘Whitehead heartbeat discrimination
task’’). Self-rated clearness of body perception was measured by questionnaire.
Results: Contrary to our hypothesis, DPD patients performed similarly to healthy controls on the two different heartbeat
detection tasks, and they had equal scores regarding their self-rated clearness of body perception. There was no correlation
of the severity of ‘‘anomalous body experiences’’ and depersonalization with measures of interoceptive accuracy. Only
among healthy controls CA in the Schandry task was positively correlated with self-rated clearness of body perception.
Depersonalization was unrelated to severity of depression or anxiety, while depression and anxiety were highly correlated.
Anxiety and depression did not modify the associations of depersonalization with interoceptive accuracy.
Conclusions: Our main findings highlight a striking discrepancy of normal interoception with overwhelming experiences of
disembodiment in DPD. This may reflect difficulties of DPD patients to integrate their visceral and bodily perceptions into a
sense of their selves. This problem may be considered an important target for psychotherapeutic treatment approaches.
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Introduction
Depersonalization-derealization disorder (DPD, DSM-5: 300.6
[1]) is characterized by an impairment of self-awareness, mainly
feelings of disembodiment and emotional numbing [2]. The
prevalence of DPD is around 1% in the general population [1,3,4].
DPD patients feel detached or as if being like an outside observer
with respect to their sensations, actions, feelings and body. During
these experiences reality testing remains intact, the symptoms are
not attributable to direct effects of a substance or another medical
condition and they are not better explained by another mental
disorder [1]. Narratives of disembodiment are a core feature of
DPD patients [2,5–8]. As reflected in the corresponding items of
the Cambridge Depersonalization Scale (CDS [9]), these experi-
ences of disembodiment include feelings of being detached from
the body, somatosensory distortions and out-of-body-experiences
[2] (Table 1).
Results from neuroimaging studies, though rare, show reduced
activation of the insular and the anterior cingulate cortex in
response to aversive affective stimuli in DPD patients as compared
to healthy controls or patients with obsessive compulsive disorder
[10]. Both structures are crucial for interoception [11,12]. In
particular the insular cortex is responsible for the representation of
visceral sensations accessible to awareness. Its activity correlates
strongly with interoceptive awareness as measured by heart beat
detection tasks [11]. There is ample of evidence that the degree of
interoceptive awareness can be conceptualized as a trait-like
sensitivity toward one’s cardiac or visceral signals [13]. Further, it
has been shown that interoception and emotional processing are
closely related [13]. Substantial studies and publications suggest
that the intensity of emotional experiences, which is specifically
attenuated in DPD patients [2,14], depends on interoceptive
awareness [13,15–21]. Further biological evidence for the
profound subjective distortions of body awareness in DPD patients
comes from a study using positron emission tomography to assess
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brain glucose metabolism of patients with DPD as compared to
healthy controls: Simeon et al. (2000) found aberrant glucose
metabolism in temporal, parietal, and occipital areas, and
functional abnormalities of the secondary and cross-modal sensory
cortex as well as areas responsible for an integrated body schema
[2,22]. Another cause of impaired interoception in DPD patients
may be their increased self-focused attention. Recently it has been
shown that self-focused attention, which is considered as crucial
factor for the maintenance of depersonalization [6,23–25],
correlated inversely with the sensitivity toward one’s cardiac
signals [26].
Interoception and emotional feelings are considered as the
fundament of the embodied self [13]. It is assumed that self-
awareness is continually regenerated in a series of bodily signals
which blend together to give rise to a continuous ‘‘stream of
consciousness’’[13]. Therefore, given the profound disruption of
self-awareness, mainly characterized by feelings of disembodiment
and emotional numbing [2], together with the neurobiological
findings of an inhibition of insular activity, DPD may be
considered as a specific disorder of embodiment and thus specific
impairments of interoception as measured by heart beat detection
tasks [2,7,27–31]. It is surprising, therefore, that there are
currently no published reports on interoception in DPD patients
using experimental interoception tasks.
As anxiety disorders and depression are frequent comorbid
conditions in patients with DPD [1,32,33], these comorbidities
need to be taken into account when investigating interoceptive
accuracy of DPD patients. For example, comorbid depression and
anxiety may have differential effects on interoceptive accuracy
[17]. A recent study of a large non-clinical sample showed
heartbeat perception to be positively correlated with anxiety and
negatively with depression. However, there was an interaction
with the level of anxiety in this non-clinical sample: In highly
anxious individuals depression was negatively correlated with
interoceptive accuracy, while there was a positive correlation for
persons low in anxiety [34]. In a study investigating a small sample
of 18 patients with major depression, patients performed equally
well compared to healthy controls on the heartbeat detection task
and better than a less depressed community sample with moderate
depression [35]. With regard to anxiety disorders, a pooled
analysis of heartbeat perception studies suggested that accurate
heart beat perception is more prevalent among panic disorder
patients than in healthy controls, depressed patients, or patients
with palpitations or individuals with occasional panic attacks [36].
No differences were found between panic disorder and other
anxiety disorders [36]. In summary, there is some evidence for an
association of trait anxiety or anxiety disorders with increased
interoceptive accuracy as measured by heartbeat detection tasks
[37]. With regard to personality disorders, a common comorbid
condition of DPD patients, a recent study found no differences
between n= 24 patients with borderline-personality disorder and
healthy controls concerning their performance on measures of
interoceptive accuracy [38].
Against this background and with the above considerations in
mind, we aimed to investigate for the first time (to our knowledge)
interoceptive accuracy in a sample of DPD patients using a healthy
comparison group free from ‘‘anomalous body experiences’’. We
applied two different methods of heartbeat detection, the
‘‘Schandry heartbeat counting task’’ [39] and a modified
‘‘Whitehead heartbeat discrimination task’’ [40], both providing
different and complimentary indices of cardiac interoceptive ( =
cardioceptive) accuracy. The Schandry paradigm operationalizes
cardioceptive accuracy by requesting participants to estimate the
number of heartbeats over various periods of time [39]. The
Whitehead task measures discrimination performance, i.e. how
accurate participants estimate the synchronicity of external stimuli
with their heartbeats [41]. Thus, the Schandry task requires the
ability to focus attention on visceral sensations, whereas the
Whitehead task represents multisensory integration, i.e. focusing
and evaluating concurrent visceral sensations and exteroceptive
stimuli concerning their temporal relationship [41]. In order to
assess the self-rated perception of the body a questionnaire was
administered [42].
In this context, we hypothesized that patients with DPD differ
from healthy volunteers in that they show poorer cardioceptive
accuracy in heartbeat counting and discrimination, and impaired
self-rated perception of the body. We further assumed that the
severity of anxiety and depression modulates cardioceptive
accuracy and subjective perception of the body.
Materials and Methods
Participants
The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the State
Board of Physicians of Rhineland-Palatinate (Germany). All partici-
pants provided their written informed consent to participate in this
study. The sample consisted of 24 DPD patients and 26 healthy
volunteers (healthy controls, HC) (Table 2). The diagnosis of DPD was
established by M.M. according to the German version of the
Structured Clinical Interview for Dissociative Disorders [43]. Partic-
ipants fulfilled the criteria of DPD according to DSM-5 (300.6) as well
as the criteria of the depersonalization-derealization-syndrome
Table 1. Narratives of disembodiment as described by the items of the Anomalous Body Experiences subscale of the Cambridge
Depersonalization Scale
Parts of my body feel as if they didn’t belong to me.
Whilst doing something I have the feeling of being a ‘‘detached observer’’ of myself.
My body feels very light, as if it were floating on air.
Familiar voices (including my own) sound remote and unreal.
Whilst fully awake I have ‘‘visions’’ in which I can see myself outside, as if I were looking my image in a mirror.
I cannot feel properly the objects that I touch with my hands for, it feels as if it were not me who were touching it.
I have the feeling of being outside my body.
When I move it doesn’t feel as if I were in charge of the movements, so that I feel ‘automatic’ and mechanical as if I were a ‘robot’.
I have to touch myself to make sure that I have a body or a real existence.
Anomalous Body Experiences [5] according to the corresponding items of the Cambridge Depersonalization Scale [9].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0089823.t001
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according to ICD-10 (F48.1). Patients were recruited from the DPD
clinic of the Department of Psychosomatic Medicine and Psychother-
apy (Mainz, Germany). All DPD patients had experienced chronic and
persistent depersonalization. The mean age at onset was 19.5 years
(standard deviation, SD, 10 years), the mean duration of the DPD was
8.3 years (SD 7.1). Persons with a lifetime diagnosis of a psychotic
disorder, brain damage and current intake of benzodiazepines or
antipsychotics were not eligible. Current mental disorders other than
DPD were as follows: Major depression (n=16, 66%), dysthymia
(n=9, 38%), social phobia (n=6, 25%), agoraphobia (n=4, 17%),
obsessive-compulsive disorder (n=1), bruxism (n=1). There were 11
patients with personality disorders (46%), with 8 from the fearful
cluster, 1 histrionic and 2 Borderline personality disorders. In the DPD
group, 11 patients were taking antidepressants (10 selective serotonin
re-uptake inhibitors, 1 venlafaxine). The rate of medication in this
inpatient sample was low, as there is no evidence-based psychophar-
macotherapy for DPD [44,45]. Healthy volunteers were recruited by
research advertisement in the university medical hospital and the
faculty of psychology. All participants received a reimbursement of 5
Euro. Sample characteristics are shown in Table 2.
Questionnaires
Body perception was assessed with a short German question-
naire, the ‘‘Kurzer Fragebogen zur Eigenwahrnehmung des
Ko¨rpers (KEKS)’’ (English: short questionnaire for body percep-
tion) [42]. The KEKS aims to measure the mere perception of the
body without conflation with the cognitive or emotional appraisal
of these perceptions. The questionnaire consists of 20 items.
Participants are asked to rate the present degree of the intensity of
their perception of body parts (e.g. toes, tongue, buttocks, eyelid,
shoulders, skin): ‘‘How precisely can you perceive your own body
parts right now?’’. The intensity is rated on a 5-point-Likert scale:
‘‘I cannot perceive (feel) it’’ (1); I can perceive it fuzzy (2); I can feel
it (3); I can feel it clearly (4); ‘‘I can perceive it very accurately’’ (5).
The KEKS score represents the mean score across the 18 items.
Scores may range from 1 to 5. Higher scores represent a more
accurate perception or feeling of the body parts. The KEKS score
has been shown to separate clearly persons experienced in Yoga
from persons without such training (69 persons experienced in
Yoga mean KEKS score = 3.47 versus 299 control persons, mean
KEKS score = 2.85) [42]. Two items of the KEKS questionnaire
are calculated separately. These two items measure the report of
illusory body perceptions by asking about the perception of the
‘‘cerebellum’’ and the ‘‘left heart valve’’ (illusory body perception
score, KEKS-ill) [42]. In the validation study of the KEKS the
internal consistency for the 18 items of the KEKS score was
excellent (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.93) and for KEKS-ill acceptable
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.71) [42]. As calculated in the study sample,
the internal consistency for the 18 items of the KEKS score was
good (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.89) and acceptable for the two items
indicating illusory body perception (KEKS-ill, Cronbach’s alpha
= 0.64).
Severity of depersonalization was assessed with the Cambridge
Depersonalization Scale (CDS, [9,46]). The CDS consists of 29
items and measures frequency and duration of depersonalization
over the last 6 months. Scores range from 0 to 290. DPD patients
typically score above 70 [9]. Based on a previous factor analysis,
we calculated a subscale ‘‘Anomalous Body Experiences (ABE) [5].
This subscale comprises 9 items from the CDS (Table 1) [5], with
scores ranging from 0 to 90. Further, the state version of the CDS
(S-CDS) was applied after the experiment. The S-CDS comprises
22 items and reflects intensity of depersonalization right now.
Scores range from 0 to 2200.
Severity of depression was measured with the Beck Depression
Inventory-II (BDI-II) [47] and anxiety with the State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T/-S) [48].
Heart beat detection tasks
Schandry heartbeat counting task [39]: The heartbeat counting
task consisted of 7 intervals of 20, 25, 35, 45, 55, 65 and 75
seconds in randomized order. Before the task started participants
were asked to focus their attention on their own heartbeat (HB).
An acoustic signal indicated the beginning and end of the period,
during which heartbeats should be counted. Participants were
asked to estimate the number of heartbeats for each period, which
was compared to their actual number of heartbeats. Cardioceptive








Modified heartbeat discrimination task based on Whitehead
[40]: Participants were asked to judge whether auditory stimuli
appeared either ‘synchronously’ or ‘delayed’ to their own
Table 2. Characteristics of the participants.
DPD healthy controls Test
n =24 n=26 p
Age (years) 27.867.5 26.461.6 Z = 0.567 0.571
Men 54.2% (n = 13) 51.9% (n = 14) Chi2 = 0.03, df = 1 0.87
Years of education* 11.961.6 12.960.6 Z = 2.704 0.007
BMI 24.165.2 21.462.4 T = 2.445, df = 48 0.018
CDS trait 142.9650.1 5.768.2 Z = 6.074 ,0.0001
CDS-ABE 41.8621.9 0.661.9 Z = 6.315 ,0.0001
CDS state 1056.36394.0 35.4658.1 Z = 6.022 ,0.0001
BDI-II 27.2611.6 3.363.2 Z = 5.897 ,0.0001
STAI (trait) 63.568.3 36.267.2 Z = 5.883 ,0.0001
Data are presented as mean 6 standard deviation or percentage (%) and numbers (n); t-test if data were normally distributed, Mann -Whitney U test if not; chi-square
test for categorical variables; CDS, Cambridge Depersonalization Scale; CDS-ABE, subscale ‘‘anomalous body experiences’’ of the CDS; BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventory
version 2; STAI, State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; *years of education (without university or professional education).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0089823.t002
Normal Interoceptive Accuracy in Depersonalization
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 February 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 2 | e89823
heartbeats. The auditory stimuli were elicited with a latency of
230 ms (‘synchronous’ trials) before or 530 ms after the R wave
(‘delayed’ trials) as measured by electrocardiography (ECG).
Previous research has demonstrated that 230 ms represents the
optimal time delay for auditory stimuli to be perceived as
synchronous with one’s heartbeat [49], whereas stimuli appearing
530 ms after an R-wave are likely to be judged as delayed to the
heartbeat [50]. Auditory stimuli were tones with a a length of
50 ms and frequency 440 Hz, comparable to earlier studies
[11,51]; the tones were presented via in-ear-headphones. During
each trial, ten consecutive stimuli with the same latency (230 or
530 ms) were presented. Participants completed 10 training trials
(5 per condition: synchronous or delayed) and 20 experimental
trials (10 per condition). Discrimination performance was calcu-
lated by using the d9 parameter derived from signal detection
theory [52]. Correctly identified synchronous (S+) trials were
defined as ‘‘hits’’, delayed trials (S2) that were incorrectly judged
as S+ trials were defined as ‘‘false alarms’’. The parameter of
interoceptive accuracy was calculated using the following formula:
CAWhitehead = d9=z hit rate - z false alarm rate.
Apparatus and Procedure
The signal of the electrocardiogram (ECG) was monitored using
three ECG Ag/AgCl electrodes (diameter: 45 mm), recorded with
a Biopac MP150 amplifier system, high-pass filtered (0.5 Hz) and
stored on a disk (sampling rate: 1 kHz) for offline analyses. R-
waves were identified online by the software programs E-Prime 1.1
and AcqKnowledge 3.9.0 running on a DELL Latitude E 6500
computer.
Before the experimental procedure, participants completed the
trait questionnaires. Participants were seated in front of a LCD
computer screen in a comfortable chair. Electrodes for ECG-
measurement were placed according to a standard lead II
configuration (left leg – right arm; ground: left arm), approximated
by placements on the torso [53].
Prior to the heartbeat detection tasks participants completed a
training trial. They were instructed to relax, keep still and not to
take their own pulse or try any other manipulations facilitating the
detection of heartbeats. Thereafter, participants completed each of
the two heartbeat detection paradigms (Whitehead; Schandry) in
permutated order across participants, interrupted by a break of
1 min. After the experiment the participants completed the state
questionnaires.
Statistical analyses
Data are presented as numbers (n) and percentages (%) or mean
6 standard deviation. Normal distribution was tested with the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov-Z Test (p#0.05 indicated significant devi-
ation from normal distribution). In the case of normal distribution
t-Tests and Pearson’s product-moment correlations were applied,
and non-parametric methods if the variable was not normally
distributed (Mann-Whitney U test, Spearman correlation). Cate-
gorical data were compared by Chi-square test. Cohen’s d was
calculated to show the effect sizes of mean differences. The
primary dependent variables were CA-Schandry and CA-White-
head and self-rated precision of body perception (KEKS score).
Differences in these scores between DPD patients and healthy
controls (HC) were compared by t-test or Mann-Whitney U test.
Further, we calculated correlation coefficients to determine
associations between depersonalization and CA-Schandry, CA-
Whitehead and self-rated body perception (KEKS) as well as
depression, anxiety and possible moderating variables (e.g. BMI,
heart rate). Correlation analyses were calculated for the two
groups separately, or for the whole sample if appropriate. For
explorative analysis we compared DPD patients stratified by use of
antidepressants, and by high versus low anxiety and depression
respectively. The high and low anxiety and depression groups
were determined by median split. Based on previous studies and
our considerations, we tested for an interaction of depersonaliza-
tion6 anxiety in the DPD group. For this purpose we calculated
an analysis of variance in the DPD group. A 262 ANOVA was
calculated to test for changes of the performance in the Whitehead
task between the training and experimental trial. For all tests a
two-sided significance threshold of a= .05 was defined a priori.
Results
Psychometric data of DPD patients and healthy controls
DPD patients did not differ from healthy controls (HC) with
regards to age and sex. DPD patients had significantly fewer years
of schooling than HC, and their BMI was significantly higher.
DPD patients differed strongly regarding severity of depersonal-
ization (CDS, d= 3.82, p,0.0001), anomalous body experiences
(CDS-ABE, d= 2.65, p,0.0001), depression (BDI, d= 2.81,
p,0.0001) and anxiety (STAI, d = 3.51, p,0.0001) (Table 2).
There was no significant correlation of severity of depersonaliza-
tion or anomalous body with depression or anxiety in both groups.
Cardioceptive accuracy and self-rated body perception
Due to technical malfunction, five participants (2 patients, 3
controls) provided incomplete data in the Whitehead paradigm
and were thus excluded from further analyses regarding this
variable. Neither were there any group differences in cardioceptive
accuracy or heart beat discrimination nor in the perception of
body parts as self-rated in the KEKS (Table 3). In the Schandry
paradigm, 20 DPD patients and 23 healthy individuals underes-
timated the number of their own heartbeats in average, whereas 4
patients and 3 controls overestimated the number (Chi2 = 0.60,
df = 1, p = 0.70). DPD patients reported significantly more illusory
body perception, i.e. perception of ‘‘cerebellum’’ and ‘‘left heart
valve’’ (KEKS-ill, d = 0.53, p,0.008, Table 3).
Based on the prima facie impression of a diverging development
of the scores in the Whitehead task from the training trial to the
experimental trial (see Figure 1), we computed exploratively an
analysis of variance (262 ANOVA) to test for an interaction with
group (DPD versus healthy controls) as between-subject factor and
the experimental condition (Whitehead training trial versus
Whitehead experimental trial) as the within-subject factor. While
in both groups no significant change of the performance in the two
trials of the Whitehead task emerged (F(1,43) = 0.011, p = 0.917),
the direction of the change between the two trials differed
significantly between groups (F(1,43) = 4.359, p = 0.043).
As shown in Table 4, in the DPD group there was no significant
correlation of severity of depersonalization with heartbeat
detection measures or self-rated clearness of body perception
(KEKS). Cardioceptive accuracy according to the Schandry task
was significantly negatively correlated with resting heart rate in
both groups (HC: r =20.479, p= 0.013; DPD r=20.416,
p,0.043). In healthy controls there was a significant positive
association between cardioceptive accuracy according to the
Schandry task and self-rated precision of body perception (KEKS)
(r = 0.444, p,0.05), whereas such an association was not present
in the DPD group. Also in the whole sample, no significant
correlations (Spearman) of heart beat detections scores, heart rate
or subjective body perception with severity of depersonalization,
anxiety or depression emerged (data not presented). There were
Normal Interoceptive Accuracy in Depersonalization
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also no significant correlations between BMI, age or education and
any one of the heartbeat detections measures, neither in separate
analyses for the two groups nor across the whole sample (data not
presented). We found no significant correlation between both
heartbeat detection measures, neither in the two subgroups (DPD
r= 0.102, p = 0.653; HC r= 0.332, p = 0.121) nor in the whole
sample (r = 0.205, p = 0.176). While depression and anxiety were
strongly correlated in both groups (DPD: r = 0.684, p,0.01;
healthy control: r=0.468, p,0.05), no significant correlation of
depersonalization with severity of depression and anxiety emerged
(Table 4).
We explored potential effects of antidepressant medication in
the DPD group by comparing DPD patients taking antidepres-
sants with those free from antidepressants. Patients with antide-
pressants did not differ significantly with respect to the heart
perception tasks (CA Schandry, CA Whitehead), heart rate,
subjective body perception (KEKS), BMI or any of the psycho-
metric scores CDS, CDS-ABE, BDI-II and STAI (see Table S1).
In order to explore possible modifying effects of depression and
anxiety, we divided the DPD group by the median in STAI (,63
versus $63) and BDI (,26 versus $26) and compared CA
Schandry, CA Whitehead, heart rate and KEKS and deperson-
alization between these two respective subgroups. There were no
significant differences between DPD patients with high anxiety (see
Table S2) or high depression (see Table S3) versus low anxiety
respectively low depression regarding performance in the heart
beat detection tasks, heart rate, subjective perception of the body
(KEKS) or severity of depersonalization. In an attempt to examine
a possible interaction of depersonalization with anxiety in the
DPD group, we calculated an ANOVA with the dependent
variables CA Schandry, CA Whitehead, heart rate or KEKS and
the following factors: high versus low anomalous body experiences
(CDS-ABE); high versus low anxiety (STAI) and their interaction
term. The high versus low categories were determined by median
split of CDS-ABE (,38 versus $38) and STAI (,63 versus $63)
in the DPD group. There were no significant effects of the factors
with the dependent variables (data not presented).
Discussion
Contrary to our hypothesis, DPD patients performed similarly
well compared to healthy controls on two different heart beat
detection tasks. In addition, they had equal scores regarding their
self-rated clearness of body perception. There was no correlation
of the severity of depersonalization and ‘‘anomalous body
experiences’’ with measures of cardioceptive accuracy. Severity
of anxiety or depression did not modify this relationship.
Interestingly, performance in the Whitehead paradigm changed
differentially between the two groups from the training to the
experimental trial. Only among healthy controls cardioceptive
accuracy in the Schandry task was positively correlated with self-
rated precision of body perception. In line with previous studies,
mean heart rate correlated negatively with cardioceptive accuracy
in the Schandry task [54]. It is considered that this inverse
relationship results from decreasing stroke volume associated with
increasing heart rate [55]. We found no significant correlation
between the two heart beat detection tasks, which is in line with
conflicting findings regarding this issue (e.g. no correlation in
[41,56], correlation in [51,57]). In both groups, the majority of
individuals underestimated the number of their actual heartbeats
in the Schandry task, as was demonstrated in earlier works [58].
In summary, results from the present study suggest that DPD
may be characterized by a remarkable discrepancy between
pervasive narratives of disembodiment and normal interoceptive
Table 3. Body perception, heart rate, and performance of heartbeat detection.
DPD Healthy controls Test
n =24 n=26 p
KEKS 2.760.6 2.960.6 T = 0.998, df = 47 0.32
KEKS-ill 1.360.5 1.160.2 Z = 1.121 0.008
Heart rate in beats/min 75.7613.3 75.868.3 T = 0.058, df = 48 0.95
CA Schandry 0.6960.19 0.7160.17 T = 0.269, df = 48 0.79
CA Whitehead d9 0.3561.06 0.6160.92 T = 0.842, df = 43 0.40
(CA Whitehead d9 training trial) 0.7260.85 0.3460.73 T = 1.681, df = 48 0.09
Data are presented as mean 6 standard deviation; means were compared by t-test if data were normally distributed, and Mann -Whitney U test if not; KEKS, short body
perception questionnaire; KEKS-ill, illusory body perception; heart rate in beats per minute; CA, cardioceptive accuracy according to the Schandry paradigm and the
Whitehead heartbeat discrimination task; in parentheses the scores of the training trial of the Whitehead task.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0089823.t003
Figure 1. Change of the performance in the Whitehead task
from the training to the experimental trial between the two
groups. Circles indicate means and error bars correspond to standard
error of mean (SEM). There were no significant within or between group
differences regarding CAWhitehead. However, the two groups differed
significantly regarding the direction of their changes (F(1,43) = 4.359,
p = 0.043).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0089823.g001
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accuracy at both behavioral (heart beat perception tasks) and
questionnaire-based levels (self-rated clearness of body perception).
This finding may reflect a conflict between DPD patients’
conceptual thinking or beliefs about themselves (i.e. meta-
cognitions) and what they actually perceive. While they feel
detached from their body and report emotional or physical
numbing, actual subjective body perception is unimpaired, and
heartbeat detection similar to normal, healthy volunteers. As
recently proposed by Garfinkel and Critchley [17], this finding
may highlight the importance of distinguishing interoceptive
awareness, i.e. the metacognitive awareness of interoceptive
accuracy (‘sensitivity’), from interoceptive accuracy, as measured
by heartbeat detection performance. Indeed, general self-reported
awareness of heartbeat detection as measured by questionnaires is
not strongly correlated with the actual performance in heartbeat
detection tasks [17,41]. Interestingly, even training in mindfulness
does not improve performance in heart beat detection tasks [59].
Thus, the discrepancy between intact interoceptive accuracy and
narratives of disembodiment may reflect difficulties of DPD
patients to integrate their actual visceral and body perceptions into
a schema of their selves or as Paul Schilder worded it succinctly for
persons with DPD: ‘‘the individual does not acknowledge himself
as a personality’’ [60]. The diverging change of the performance in
the Whitehead task between healthy controls and DPD patients
might be interpreted in terms of difficulties for DPD patients when
attending to interoceptive signals; this might explain why they
performed ‘‘worse’’ after the training trial. However, very
important to note, there was no significant within group change,
only the interaction with the factor group was significant, thus
challenging this interpretation. Finally, regarding our main
finding, we found in a previous study on emotional processing in
DPD a similar disconnection of cognitive evaluation from bodily
responses: while DPD patients showed stronger and more
modulated skin conductance responses to acoustic emotional
stimuli as compared to (non DPD) patient controls, they rated the
emotional sounds significantly more neutral than clinical and
healthy controls [14].
From a neurobiological perspective, it has been suggested that
interoceptive awareness results from the interplay of both bottom-
up (afferent signals from the body, heart etc.) and top-down
processes (cognitive evaluations, and belief-based associations
processed in the temporo-parietal cortex) [61]. In this context it
is interesting to note that hyperactivity of the temporo-parietal
cortex, which may reflect exaggerated belief-based associations
[61], has been demonstrated in DPD [22,62]. The increased
reporting of illusory body perceptions (e.g. of the cerebellum) in
the current study is in line with this finding and suggests that DPD
patients may be more occupied with belief-based associations than
actual perceptions. Experiments eliciting illusory body perceptions
(e.g. rubber hand illusions) might be promising research
approaches for the investigation of the processes underlying
embodiment in DPD. Last but not least, only in the group of
healthy persons cardioceptive accuracy was positively correlated
with self-rated clearness of body perception, which suggests better
integration of internal stimuli and meta-cognitive beliefs.
Concerning the high comorbidity of the DPD patients, our
sample was comparable with samples from other experimental or
clinical studies [14,33,63,64]. Depersonalization severity was
unrelated to severity of depression or anxiety, while depression
and anxiety were highly correlated. This underscores the
independence of depersonalization from depression and anxiety
[4,65,66]. In line with that, we could not find any effect of anxiety
and depression on interoceptive sensitivity or subjective body
perception or any hint on a anxiety6depersonalization interaction
in the DPD sample.
The following limitations have to be kept in mind concerning
our considerations: First, the sample size may have limited the
power of the current study to detect small differences of
interoceptive accuracy between DPD patients and healthy
controls. Nevertheless, even if there might be small differences
Table 4. Correlation coefficients of heartbeat detection measures and heart rate with psychometric scores: DPD patients white
row and healthy controls (HC) grey row.
CA Whitehead HR CDS CDS-ABE BDI STAI KEKS
CA Schandry DPD 0.102 20.416* 20.337 20.331 20.258 20.059 0.137
HC 0.332 20.479* 20.164 (r) 20.137 0.059 20.179 0.444*
CA Whitehead (d9) DPD 20.272 0.180 0.257 0.086 0.092 0.035
HC 0.023 20.319 (r) 20.243 20.87 20.141 0.012
Heart rate (beats/min) (HR)DPD 20.160 20.035 0.353 0.113 20.162
HC 20.045 (r) 20.030 20.182 0.134 20.262
CDS DPD 0.827** 20.051 0.023 0.108
HC (r) 0.428* 0.159 0.038 0.103
CDS-ABE DPD 20.210 20.103 20.163
HC 0.133 0.137 0.176
BDI-II (depression) DPD 0.684** 20.217
HC 0.468* 20.212
STAI (anxiety) DPD 0.076
HC 20.115
Pearson correlation coefficients if variables were normally distributed and Spearman (r) if not; level of significance (2-sided): **p,0.01, *p,0.05; CA, cardioceptive
accuracy according to the Schandry paradigm and the Whitehead paradigm (d9); CDS, severity of depersonalization; CDS-ABE, severity of anomalous body experiences
according to the CDS; BDI-II, severity of depression according to the Beck Depression Inventory second version; STAI, severity of trait anxiety according to the State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory (trait version); KEKS, short body perception questionnaire; sample comprises DPD patients (n = 24) and healthy controls (HC) (n = 26); missing values
HC/DPD: CA Schandry 1/0, CA Whitehead 3/2; HR 1/0; STAI 1/0; KEKS 1/0.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0089823.t004
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between DPD patients and health persons, this would still contrast
strongly with the overwhelming experiences of disembodiment of
DPD sufferers. It is unlikely that small differences in heart beat
detection performance should result in such large differences in
subjective experiences of disembodiment. Second, despite sub-
stantial correlations between accuracy in heartbeat perception and
the detection of sensations originating from other organ systems
[67,68], it has to be mentioned that the here reported results may
be limited to interoceptive accuracy for cardiac sensations. Third,
although we found no modifying effect of depression or anxiety
alone or an interaction of depersonalization6anxiety, more
complex interactions of comorbidity with medication and deper-
sonalization or unknown variables might have affected the present
results. For disentangling such complex interactions, however,
much larger samples would be needed. Forth, out of 24 patients 11
took antidepressants. Although we found no effect, we cannot
exclude that antidepressants might be associated with performance
in heart beat detection. To our knowledge, there is no systematic
investigation on this issue so far. One study reported an effect of
medication on performance in the Schandry task for inpatients
with panic disorders but not for patients with depression or
somatoform disorders [69]. Dunn et al. (2007) reported that
medicated patients with major depression performed better on
heartbeat perception accuracy [35]. Another study, however, of
patients with panic disorder reported an inverse relationship [58].
Fifth, future studies should include other approaches for the
investigation of interoception, such as psychophysiological mea-
sures of interoceptive accuracy, e.g. heartbeat evoked potentials
[70,71], as these methods do not necessitate conscious heartbeat
perception and are, therefore, independent from cognitive
processes. A final limitation concerns the difference in BMI
between the DPD and the control group. As previously
demonstrated, BMI affects interoception [72,73], and although
not large, it cannot be ruled out that this difference may have
confounded the current results. However, because there was no
meaningful association of BMI with heartbeat detection, we
assume confounding as unlikely.
In conclusion, our main findings highlight the discrepancy of
normal interoceptive accuracy with overwhelming experiences of
disembodiment in DPD. This striking discrepancy may reflect
difficulties of DPD patients to integrate their actual visceral and
bodily perceptions into a sense of their selves. This problem may
be considered as an important target for DPD specific psycholog-
ical treatment approaches. Further studies on the mechanisms of
disembodiment and the measures to overcome this disembodiment
are needed.
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